The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. The specific goal of this proposal is to design and implement efficient self-healing mechanisms that allow a sensor network to recover from node compromises by itself. To achieve this goal, this proposal describes a self-healing framework that consists of three sequential phases: node compromise detection, node revocation and network reconfiguration, and focuses on designing efficient schemes for each of these phases. It proposes to identify suspicious sensor nodes through time synchronization protocols and location changes of sensor nodes, 
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ABSTRACT
The specific goal of this proposal is to design and implement efficient self-healing mechanisms that allow a sensor network to recover from node compromises by itself. To achieve this goal, this proposal describes a self-healing framework that consists of three sequential phases: node compromise detection, node revocation and network reconfiguration, and focuses on designing efficient schemes for each of these phases. It proposes to identify suspicious sensor nodes through time synchronization protocols and location changes of sensor nodes, respectively, in addition to other sources of discovering suspicious nodes. It then investigates techniques to attest the authenticity of the code running in the suspected nodes to check if the suspected nodes are really compromised. Two key updating schemes, one for group key updating and the other for pairwise key updating, are proposed to invalidate the security keys possessed by the nodes that have been identified as compromised.
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Statement of Problem
When sensor networks are deployed in an unattended and hostile environment such as a battlefield, sensor nodes must be furnished with cryptographic mechanisms to protect the confidentiality and authenticity of sensor readings from being jeopardized by an adversary. Cryptography, however, can only provide the first layer of protection. The low cost of sensor nodes (e.g., less than $1 as envisioned for smart dust) precludes the built-in tamper-resistance capability of sensor nodes. Actually, recent advances in physical attack show that even memory chips with built-in tamper-resistance are subject to various memory read-out attacks. Thus, the lack of tamper-resistance coupled with the unattended nature gives an adversary the opportunity to break into the captured sensor nodes to obtain the code and the sensitive information such as encryption or authentication keys loaded in these sensor nodes. An adversary may change the original code to malicious code, and it may deploy many cloned malicious nodes with the obtained keys. The cloned nodes can participate in the network to launch various kinds of passive and active security attacks.
Recently several preventative security mechanisms have been proposed to restrict the security impact of node compromises to one-hop range of the compromised nodes and filter out false sensor readings injected into the network by a certain number of compromised colluding nodes. Despite the increased complexity and performance overhead, these schemes do not solve the node compromise problem completely. When the number of compromised nodes exceeds the security threshold in these schemes, an adversary can break the system and easily launch security attacks. To fully address the node compromise problem, we believe that it is essential to detect the compromised nodes in a timely fashion and isolate them from the rest of the network. It is desired that a sensor network have the self-healing capability so that the security of the system will not be broken even after a relatively high number of sensor nodes have been compromised. With the self-healing capability, a sensor network can employ lightweight prevention techniques to reduce the normal operational overhead.
Summary of The Most Important Results
To achieve the design goals, we have developed through this project a suite of security mechanisms spanning node compromise detection, verification, and revocation.
2.1: Direct Results from this project
-based on verifying the genuineness of the running program, we propose two distributed software-based attestation schemes that are well tailored for sensor networks. These schemes are based on a pseudorandom noise generation mechanism and a lightweight block-based pseudorandom memory traversal algorithm. Each node is loaded with pseudorandom noise in its empty program memory before deployment, and later on multiple neighbors of a suspicious node collaborate to verify the integrity of the code containing sensor worms. Our work is the first one proposing countermeasures towards sensor worms.
[Yi et al., Mobihoc 2008]
-we studied the problem of node cloning attacks in sensor networks. The defenses against clone attacks are not only very few, but also suffer from selective interruption of detection and high overhead (computation and memory). We propose a new effective and efficient scheme, called SET, to detect such clone attacks. The key idea of SET is to detect clones by computing set operations (intersection and union) of exclusive subsets in the network. First, SET securely forms exclusive unit subsets among one-hop neighbors in the network in a distributed way. This secure subset formation also provides the authentication of nodes' subset membership. SET then employs a tree structure to compute non-overlapped set operations and integrates interleaved authentication to prevent unauthorized falsification of subset information during forwarding. Randomization is used to further make the exclusive subset and tree formation unpredictable to an adversary. Performance analysis and simulations also demonstrate that the proposed scheme is more efficient than existing schemes from both communication and memory cost standpoints. [Choi et Aggregation Protocol for sensor networks, based on the principles of divide-and-conquer and commit-and-attest. SDAP can achieve the level of efficiency close to an ordinary hop-by-hop aggregation protocol while providing certain assurance on the trustworthiness of the aggregation result.
-Another important issue we studied is tolerating mobile sink compromises [Song et al., Mobihoc'05,TOSN'08]. Mobile sinks are dispatched to perform critical actions (e.g., collecting data, node revocation) in a sensor network, so their compromises will have catastrophic impacts on sensor applications. We were the first one studying this problem and came up with effective solutions based on the principles of least privilege to minimize the impact of mobile sink compromises.
2.2: Additional Results with partial support from this grant
-For sensor networks deployed to monitor and report real events, event source location privacy is an attractive and critical security property, which unfortunately is also very difficult and expensive to achieve. This is not only because adversaries may attack against sensor source privacy through traffic analysis, but also because sensor networks are very limited in resources. Partially supported by this project, we also developed several schemes for sensor source location privacy.
